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Summary
To make adaptive choices, individuals must sometimes exhibit 
patience, forgoing immediate benefits to acquire more valu-
able future rewards [1–3]. Although humans account for future 
consequences when making temporal decisions [4], many an-
imal species wait only a few seconds for delayed benefits [5–
10]. Current research thus suggests a phylogenetic gap be-
tween patient humans and impulsive, present-oriented animals 
[9, 11], a distinction with implications for our understanding of 
economic decision making [12] and the origins of human coop-
eration [13]. On the basis of a series of experimental results, 
we reject this conclusion. First, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) exhibit a degree of patience 
not seen in other animals tested thus far. Second, humans 
are less willing to wait for food rewards than are chimpanzees. 
Third, humans are more willing to wait for monetary rewards 
than for food, and show the highest degree of patience only 
in response to decisions about money involving low opportu-
nity costs. These findings suggest that core components of the 
capacity for future-oriented decisions evolved before the hu-
man lineage diverged from apes. Moreover, the different levels 
of patience that humans exhibit might be driven by fundamen-
tal differences in the mechanisms representing biological ver-
sus abstract rewards.
Results
When asked to decide between ten dollars in 30 days and 11 
dollars in 31 days, people typically prefer the larger reward. 
However, when asked to choose between ten dollars now and 
11 dollars tomorrow, people are more impulsive and prefer 
the immediate reward [3, 4]. These inconsistent preferences 
reveal that people often trade off between immediate and fu-
ture benefits. Nonhuman animals must also make time-sensi-
tive decisions about mating or foraging in their natural envi-
ronments [1, 14]. Experiments with captive birds, rodents, and 
primates [5–10], however, show that many nonhuman species 
wait less than a minute (often only a few seconds) for a larger, 
delayed food reward when offered an immediate alternative. 
Relative to humans, who will frequently wait weeks or months 
for larger monetary rewards [4], animals thus appear to be im-
pulsive over a radically reduced timescale.
These extreme differences between humans and nonhu-
mans seem to provide powerful evidence that patience is a 
uniquely human trait (as suggested by [11, 12, 15]). But is this 
cognitive divide real? Some chimpanzees can wait several 
minutes in delay of gratification and exchange tasks [16–18], 
suggesting higher levels of patience in other hominoids. Two 
pieces of evidence are therefore required to test the unique-
ness of human patience. First, if our species’ temporal pref-
erences originated in the human lineage, then our two closest 
phylogenetic relatives—bonobos and chimpanzees—should 
make impulsive decisions like other animals. Second, humans 
should wait longer than animals in directly comparable con-
texts—such as during decisions about food, a currency with 
more direct evolutionary relevance.
We provide a systematic test of these predictions by (1) 
comparing the temporal preferences of bonobos, chimpan-
zees, and humans in a food task, and (2) examining human 
temporal preferences across contexts—for iterated choices in-
volving food or money, and in response to more typical dis-
counting questionnaires. Our iterated task differed from stan-
dard economic tasks in several ways. First, subjects select 
between real rather than hypothetical (e.g., [19]) or partially re-
alized (e.g., [20]) rewards. Second, subjects experience de-
lays and pay an opportunity cost for waiting because they can-
not concurrently engage in other activities or proceed to the 
next decision. Increasing evidence suggests that both the ex-
perience of delays [15, 21, 22] and variations in reward type 
[19, 23–26] can influence human preferences. Nonetheless, 
the majority of studies investigating human temporal choice in-
volve low-cost choices about money, an evolutionarily novel 
reward that only humans are motivated to acquire [27]. In con-
trast, most animal studies necessarily involve biological re-
wards and higher opportunity costs. Thus, by letting human 
subjects make decisions about food rewards and experience 
delays, we offer a more appropriate methodology for compari-
son across species.
Study 1: Temporal Preferences in Bonobos and 
Chimpanzees
In the first study, we characterized the temporal preferences 
of chimpanzees and bonobos, determining the delay at which 
they chose equally between a smaller, immediate food reward, 
and larger, delayed food reward (as in [6, 8]; Figure 1). Bono-
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bos showed indifference when the larger reward was delayed 
by a mean of 74.4 s (standard error [SE] = ± 8.5 s), whereas 
chimpanzees waited a mean of 122.6 s (SE = ± 15.9 s), a sig-
nificantly longer period [t(8) = 2.68, p = 0.03, two tailed]. Both 
species waited longer than did other animals previously tested 
in a similar manner [6, 8], including other primates (Figure 2). 
Finally, neither species’ pattern of data can be explained by 
the short-term maximization of intake rate over repeated trials, 
a model that has been successfully applied to the choices of 
other nonhumans [5, 8]. This suggests that the apes made de-
cisions over longer temporal horizons than did other animals. 
Accordingly, a long-term rate-maximizing currency [28], which 
is more farsighted than most species’ patterns of choice (see 
[14] for a review), can account for the bonobos’ preferences. 
However, chimpanzees are significantly more patient than ex-
pected by this model (see the Supplemental Data, following 
References). That is, chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit dif-
ferent temporal preferences than do other nonhumans exam-
ined thus far, and available models of choice cannot entirely 
account for this difference.
Study 2: Comparison of Patience in Humans and 
Chimpanzees
Although both ape species waited longer than other animals 
for food rewards, humans express a willingness to wait days 
or even years to acquire monetary rewards [4]. Consequently, 
here we provide the first direct comparison of chimpanzee (n = 
19) and human (n = 40) temporal preferences; bonobos could 
not be included because of sample size limits. The two spe-
cies made a series of choices between a smaller food reward 
(two pieces) and larger reward (six pieces): In the delay condi-
tion, the small reward was available immediately and the large 
reward was available only after a 2 min delay, whereas in the 
control condition, both options were available immediately. The 
control condition therefore measured subjects’ baseline mo-
tivation to choose the larger reward, and assessed possible 
changes in motivation due to food consumption. Each human 
participant experienced one condition, whereas chimpanzees 
experienced both in a counterbalanced order.
We first compared the preferences of the human partici-
pants (n = 20 per condition) and the chimpanzees in their first 
test session (to ensure that prior experience did not influence 
chimpanzees; delay condition n = 10, control condition n = 9). 
Figure 3 shows that although both species strongly preferred 
the larger reward when available immediately (percent choice: 
chimpanzees = 88.9 ± 4.8%, humans = 77.5 ± 7.4%), only 
chimpanzees maintained this preference when required to wait 
two minutes (chimpanzees = 71.7 ± 6.6%, humans = 19.2 ± 
4.4%; Figure 3). Condition [repeated-measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA): F(1, 55) = 29.16, p < 0.001] and species 
[F(1, 55) = 18.78, p < 0.001] influenced choices, but not ses-
Figure 1. The Ape Discounting Apparatus Used in Studies 1 and 2
Subjects could choose between a small, immediate reward (two grape halves) and a large, delayed reward (six grape halves). Subjects faced the 
experimenter (E) through a Plexiglas panel; this panel had hand holes on either side so subjects could insert their fingers to make choices. E sat 
in front of a Table (75 × 40 × 50 cm) with two sliding platforms (9 × 12 cm) for food rewards (side assignment was counterbalanced within a ses-
sion). Each trial started when E removed an occluder blocking access to the table; subjects then had 15 s to indicate a choice. Subjects indicated 
their preference by sliding the choice panel (70 cm wide, 9 cm tall, attached to the front of the table) to uncover either the left or right hole, and 
then could access their chosen food option when E slid the platform forward (immediately if subjects chose an immediate reward, but after a delay 
if they chose a delayed reward). E removed the forgone option after the subject made a choice. Subjects could take as long as they wanted to eat 
the food, and a trial ended when the subject placed the last piece of food in her mouth. E then replaced the occluder; the next trial began after a 30 
s intertrial interval (ITI). Subjects in both studies completed no more than one session per day.
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sion half [ F(1, 55) = 0.36, p = 0.55]. An interaction between 
species and condition [F(1, 55) = 8.73, p < 0.005] showed that 
although the species did not differ in the control condition, hu-
mans chose the larger reward significantly less often in the 
delay condition than in the control condition, and less than 
chimpanzees overall (Tukey post-hoc tests; p < 0.005 for all 
significant cases).
To confirm that chimpanzees were sensitive to the delay, we 
next used a within-subjects analysis comparing individual chim-
panzees’ choices across both conditions. Overall, chimpanzees 
chose the large reward more in the control condition [control 
condition = 89.5 ± 3.2%, delay condition = 66.7 ± 4.8%; paired 
t(18) = 4.10, p < 0.001 two tailed]. Both species therefore made 
tradeoffs between rewards and time, although chimpanzees ex-
hibited greater patience than did humans when required to wait 
for the larger payoff (Movies S1 and S2).
Humans might not have waited in the delay condition be-
cause they did not wish to consume larger quantities of food. 
Three lines of evidence suggest this is not the case. First, 
both species strongly preferred the larger reward in the con-
trol condition—and whereas the chimpanzees’ preference for 
the larger reward dropped by 19% in the delay condition, the 
human subjects’ preference dropped by 75%. Second, neither 
species’ preferences changed across sessions in either con-
dition, indicating that the humans did not stop choosing the 
larger amount because they become satiated over repeated 
trials. Finally, an additional analysis indicates that their choices 
in the delay condition were not due to a lack of hunger (see 
the Supplemental Data).
Comparative analyses of cognition are notoriously difficult 
to conduct because of the inherent difficulty of equating meth-
odologies across species. In the present study, chimpanzees 
and humans might not have faced identical waiting costs nor 
had an identical desire for the food. That said, neither species 
was food deprived, both could access food outside the test, 
and neither showed evidence of satiation. Altogether, these re-
sults suggest that humans and apes show comparable prefer-
ences when confronted with very similar temporal decisions.
Study 3: Human Patience and Reward Type
In study 2, human participants showed markedly different be-
havior in response to the iterated food problems than they do 
in more typical decisions involving money. We therefore con-
ducted a third study to assess how reward type (money or 
food) and experiential context (real or hypothetical money 
and delays) impacts human decision making. A new group 
of human participants (n = 20) made iterated temporal deci-
sions like those in study 2, but over small amounts of money 
(20 cents now versus 60 cents after 2 min). On average, par-
ticipants waited on 56.7% of trials [SE = ± 8.8%]. Comparing 
these participants to those from the delayed food condition 
showed that people were more than three times as willing to 
wait for small amounts of money than for food [t(38) = 3.839, 
p = 0.001, two tailed] (Figure 4). Individual subject data shows 
Figure 2. Delay at Indifference for Various Primate 
Species
In study 1, bonobos and chimpanzees chose between 
two pieces of food available immediately and six pieces 
of food available after some delay. Stevens et al. 2005 [8] 
found indifference points in a similar manner for common 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) and cotton-top tamarins 
(Saguinus oedipus). Error bars represent standard error 
of the mean indifference point for each species.
Figure 3. Human and Chimpanzee Preferences for Larger Food 
Rewards
In the delay condition (study 2), subjects chose between two food 
items available immediately and six food items available after 2 min, 
whereas in the control condition, both reward amounts were avail-
able immediately. Chimpanzee data is from their first test session. Er-
ror bars represent standard error of mean proportional choice for the 
larger reward.

























that whereas 40% of subjects in the delayed money condition 
waited every trial to receive an additional 40 cents, not a sin-
gle subject did so to acquire more food. Critically, this result 
rules out the possibility that subjects in the delayed food con-
dition did not wait because the paradigm was inherently aver-
sive: Subjects in the delayed money condition faced an identi-
cal situation and opportunity costs, but were frequently willing 
to wait for more rewards.
As a final test, we examined all human participants’ (n = 
60) preferences on a hypothetical discounting questionnaire; 
such questionnaires carry low opportunity costs for choosing 
the larger reward. We used participants’ responses over a se-
ries of ten questions (e.g., “Would you prefer to receive $31 to-
day or $59 in 150 days?”) to calculate the hyperbolic discount-
ing factor (k), frequently used as an index of discounting levels 
in such contexts. Consistent with past findings, subjects exhib-
ited a mean discount factor of k = 0.0116 (see the Supplemen-
tal Data). This value predicts that participants would be willing 
to wait up to 172 days for 60 dollars over an immediate 20 dol-
lars—in contrast to their more impulsive preferences when re-
quired to actually wait 2 min delays to acquire food or money.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that humans share similar levels of 
patience with bonobos and chimpanzees in some contexts. 
Both members of the Pan genus preferred to wait for larger 
delayed rewards, and did so for longer periods than other non-
human animals tested thus far. Additionally, chimpanzees were 
actually more patient than humans when compared on simi-
lar temporal tasks. We conclude that a capacity for patience in 
the context of food rewards evolved before the human lineage 
split. Based on the comparative evidence, we also suggest 
that the last common ancestor of Homo and Pan possessed 
an extended temporal horizon for decisions about food. Be-
cause short temporal horizons could preclude the evolution of 
sophisticated capacities such as mental time travel [11] or re-
ciprocal altruism [13], these findings imply that apes’ abilities 
to plan for future activities [29, 30] or engage in flexible coop-
erative interactions [31, 32] might have arisen once the con-
straint of impulsivity was lifted.
Higher tolerance for delayed food rewards could have 
evolved as a foraging adaptation, and variation between 
closely related species might reflect differences in their natural 
ecology. For example, the varying levels of patience exhibited 
by callitrichid monkeys across contexts maps onto differences 
in their wild foraging patterns [8, 33]. Notably, chimpanzees in-
habit environments characterized by small, unpredictable food 
patches with unstable fruit availability, whereas bonobos live 
in comparatively productive environments [34, 35]. Accord-
ingly, variation in habitat has been proposed as a major selec-
tive force shaping the disparate social behaviors of Pan [36]. 
We suggest that ecology might also underlie differences in 
Pan’s nonsocial cognition: Chimpanzees may generally toler-
ate higher additional costs to procure food, such as increased 
work effort, longer travel distances, and the temporal costs 
explored here. Notably, there is extensive evidence for hunt-
ing and extractive tool technology in wild chimpanzees but not 
bonobos. Their respective temporal preferences might there-
fore promote optimal foraging rates in their different natural 
ecologies, although not necessarily in laboratory experiments 
(e.g [1, 14]).
Though we might share similar patience levels with apes 
during some kinds of choices, we appear to have evolved a 
greater capacity for patience in other contexts (as indicated by 
the questionnaire responses). Why this difference emerged is 
not entirely clear. As study 3 demonstrates, reward type is one 
factor that influences preferences, and monetary rewards have 
many properties that distinguish them from biologically central 
rewards like food: They are storable, can be convertible into 
other reward currencies, might not be immediately rewarding in 
the same way that biological currencies are, and can take on ex-
tremely large values. Most studies of economic decision making 
involve choices about much larger amounts than those used in 
the iterated task, and reward magnitude influences human pa-
tience [20, 37]. Importantly, the concrete rewards used in animal 
studies must necessarily be small, and it is unclear whether any 
rewards of relevance to nonhumans could take on such large 
values. Furthermore, some level of temporal impulsivity might 
be evolutionarily favored in foraging contexts so that it could be 
ensured that organisms maximize their rate of gain [1, 14, 28, 
38], but rate might not be a relevant currency for all decisions. In 
particular, total gains could be more important when making de-
cisions about money—especially if the opportunity costs associ-
ated with waiting for money are typically low relative to the costs 
incurred when actively foraging for food.
The human participants’ increased willingness to wait for 
money over food in study 3 aligns with previous results [19, 
23] despite the use of very different paradigms. This suggests 
that the contrast between decisions about abstract rewards—
or “cognitive” rewards—and decisions about basic rewards 
[12, 26] may be quite robust. Notably, even limited exposure 
to money can systematically alter people’s goals and behav-
ior [39], and cognitive and basic rewards recruit overlapping 
[40] but possibly distinct [41] neural systems. As such, hu-
Figure 4. Human Preference for Delayed Food and Money
Subjects chose between a larger, delayed reward and a smaller, im-
mediate alternative during an iterated, experiential discounting task 
involving either food rewards (delay condition, study 2) or monetary 
rewards (study 3). Error bars represent standard error of mean propor-
tional choice for the delayed reward.
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man preferences can differ depending on biological relevance: 
Decisions about money are not necessarily representative of 
all decisions. It is therefore essential to examine preferences 
across a wide range of contexts to fully understand both the 
evolutionary pressures shaping human choice and the cogni-
tive mechanisms underlying decision making.
Experimental Procedures
Study 1: Temporal Preferences in Chimpanzees and Bonobos
Subjects
We tested five chimpanzees (8 to 30 years; three females and two 
males) and five bonobos (8 to 23 years; two females and three males), 
socially housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in 
Leipzig, Germany. Apes had ad libitum access to water, were never 
food deprived, had access to food outside experimental contexts, and 
could stop participating at any time.
Procedure
Subjects chose between a small, immediate reward and a large, de-
layed reward (see Figure 1). Each session consisted of four introduc-
tory trials (forced choice with only one option available) for familiar-
ization, and ten choice trials followed. The large rewards’ delay was 
adjusted in a subsequent session according to a subject’s preferences 
in the previous session (see the Supplemental Data). We determined 
each subject’s indifference point by comparing the mean delay to large 
of their last five sessions with the mean delay to large of their previous 
five sessions (as in [6, 8]). Subjects were considered indifferent when 
these means differed by less than 10%. The mean delay of a subject’s 
last five sessions was used as their estimated indifference point (see 
the Supplemental Data).
Study 2: Comparison of Patience in Humans and Chimpanzees
Subjects
We tested 19 chimpanzees (4 to 31 years; 13 females and six males) 
and 40 adult humans. Eighteen participants were from the Max Planck 
Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany (mean 
age: 27.7; eight females and ten males) and 22 were from Harvard 
University (mean age: 20.5; ten females and 12 males). These popu-
lations did not differ in an initial analysis (see the Supplemental Data), 
so they were combined.
Chimpanzee Procedure
Each chimpanzee completed three sessions per condition, with the 
same general procedure as study 1 (see Figure 1). For each condition, 
the first session consisted of 16 introductory trials. Subjects then com-
pleted two test sessions, each consisting of four introductory trials and 
then six choice trials. After approximately 1 week, subjects completed 
their second condition.
Human Procedure
Human participants completed one session, randomly assigned to 
condition. In advance, they were informed that the experiment would 
take up to 45 min, and asked to refrain from eating for the hour prior 
to the experiment if possible to ensure food motivation. After obtain-
ing informed consent, the participant and experimenter (E) sat across 
from each other at a table. E read from a script (see the Supplemental 
Data), informing participants that they would first complete four “prac-
tice trials” (introductory trials), and then make a series of choices be-
tween the two options (six trials like the chimpanzees, although partic-
ipants did not know how many in advance). Participants in the delay 
condition were not told the delay’s duration, but experienced it in the 
practice period beforehand. Participants then selected their preferred 
food (raisins, peanuts, M&M’s, Goldfish crackers, or popcorn). A glass 
of water was available throughout.
During introductory trials, E placed a cup on the table and asked 
how many items it contained (either two or six). In the control condi-
tion E said “You can now have the food” immediately after the partici-
pant responded. In the delay condition E said this immediately for the 
small reward, and after two minutes for the larger option. E moved 3 m 
away from the subject to another chair during the delay. In test trials, E 
placed two options on the table (counterbalanced for side assignment) 
and said “Do you prefer this cup or this cup?” As with the apes, E re-
moved the forgone option after the choice, participants could take as 
long as they wanted to eat the food, and a 30 s intertrial interval (ITI) 
began when they placed the last piece in their mouth.
After the food task, participants completed a questionnaire (see the 
Supplemental Data) including hypothetical discounting questions [20] 
and scales assessing hunger and food preference [25]. Fourteen ad-
ditional subjects reported that they were not hungry or did not like the 
food, and were excluded from the main analyses to ensure that the 
food was rewarding for the humans. However, these individuals did 
not affect the main results (see the Supplemental Data).
Study 3: Human Patience and Reward Type
Subjects and Procedure
We tested a naive group of 20 participants from the Max Planck In-
stitute for Evolutionary Anthropology (mean age = 27.6 years; 12 fe-
males and eight males). Participants completed one session identi-
cal to the delayed food condition but involving choices about money 
(two 10 cent coins versus six 10 cent euro coins; see the Supplemen-
tal Data). Subjects knew they could keep all money from the experi-
ment, and were requested to transfer the money into another cup after 
E said “You can now have the money.” The next ITI began when the 
participant finished transferring the coins. Subjects completed a ques-
tionnaire after the main task as in study 2.
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Supplemental Experimental Procedures
Study 1: Temporal Preferences in Bonobos and Chimpanzees
Subjects
Ten adult and subadult chimpanzees and bonobos participated in
this experiment (see Table S1). Subjects were socially housed at
the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center in the Leipzig Zoo,
Germany. The chimpanzees lived in a group of 17 individuals. The
bonobos lived in a group of six individuals (including one young in-
fant). They spent the day in a 4000 m2 outdoor area, and a 400 m2 in-
door area, both of which have climbing structures, enrichment items
such as foraging boxes, and natural vegetation, water streams, and
various other natural features. At night, they slept in a series of
rooms approximately 47 m2. Both species are fed various fruits, veg-
etables, and cereals several times per day independent of cognitive
tests. Grapes are a regular component of the apes’ daily diet in this
facility, and are known to be a desirable food for both the chimpan-
zees and bonobos. A familiar experimenter tested subjects individ-
ually in familiar testing rooms (approximately 15 m2); mothers with
dependent offspring were tested with their child present in the test-
ing room. All ten subjects were naive to discounting tasks.
Experimenter Behavior during Delays
If the subject chose the large reward, the experimenter removed the
forgone option but did not push the food platform forward until the
delay concluded; during this delay period, the experimenter sat
looking down with her hands behind her back and did not socially
interact with the subject.
Delay Adjustment Across Session
In the first session, both rewards were available immediately. If
a subject demonstrated a preference for either reward during a given
session, then the delay to receive the large reward was adjusted in
their subsequent session (delays were always kept constant within
a given session). Specifically, if subjects choose the large reward
eight or more times, the delay to large was increased by 10 s; if
they choose the small reward more than eight times, the delay was
decreased by 10 s. Weaker preferences (six to seven choices) re-
sulted in 5 s increments. If subjects had no preference, the delay
to large remained the same.
Food Motivation Levels
In addition to the main analysis, we performed an additional statis-
tical analysis to assess how subjects made choices within sessions.
We arcsine, square-root transformed all proportional choices to nor-
malize the data. We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA com-
paring subjects’ performance in the first half to the second half of all
sessions, with species as a between-subjects factor. There was
a significant effect of species [F(1,8) = 14.39, p < 0.01], but no effect
of session half or interactions with session half. This indicates that
subjects of both species had consistent choice strategies and re-
tained constant levels of motivation to acquire the food over a given
session.
Rate Maximization
We quantitatively assessed whether the two species’ patterns of
choice matched the predictions of a short-term rate-maximization
model, as is the case in European starlings [S1] and cotton-top tam-
arins [S2]. This model predicts that foragers optimize gain in reward
per unit time [S3]—that is, decision makers maximize the rate (R) of
a choice, R = A/(t + h), where A is the reward amount, t is the delay to
receive the reward after a choice has been made, and h is the time
required to process or handle the reward. Rate maximization thus
predicts that individuals should be indifferent between the small
and large rewards in this experiment when the intake rate of the small
option (two grape halves) equals that of the large option (six grape
halves): A2/(t2 + h2) = A6/(t6 + h6).
Handling times (h2 and h6) for both species were estimated from
measurements of the period between a subject’s first reach for the
grape halves once they became available, and when they placed
the last grape half in their mouth. These measurements were ob-
tained for six introductory small-reward trials and six introductory
large-reward trials for each subject (Table S1). In addition, we coded
20 introductory small-reward trials (two per subject) to determine
the length of time necessary for the experimenter to push the small
food reward forward once the subject made a choice. On average,
the experimenter took 1.6 s to push the reward forward so that the
subject could access it. Measurements of handling time (see Table
S1) indicate that bonobos took longer than chimpanzees to eat
both the smaller and larger reward; on average the bonobos took
8.5 s to eat two pieces and 27.7 s to eat six pieces, whereas chim-
panzees took 5.3 s to eat two pieces and 19.3 s to eat six pieces. Be-
cause animals discount future rewards more heavily when handling
times are increased under some circumstances [S4], this could
be one reason that bonobos did not wait as long as chimpanzees
overall.
Using these handling times and 1.6 s as the delay estimate on the
short reward, we calculated the predicted long delay at which sub-
jects should be indifferent between the two rewards if they maximize
intake rate in this way. Each species’ indifference point prediction is
a mean of individual subject’s predicted indifference points. That is,
we applied the rate-maximization equation to each subject rather
than to the overall species means. If predicted indifference points
were negative for a given subject, we used a time of 0 s (as in [S2]).
The predicted average rate-maximizing indifference point of chim-
panzees was 2.6 s, and the predicted indifference point for bonobos
was 3.1 s. Chimpanzees and bonobos would thus have to exhibit
very high levels of temporal impulsivity to maximize their rate of
gain over the short term (see Table S2).
Because both species deviate extensively from these predictions,
it is likely that bonobos and chimpanzees make choices over a longer
temporal horizon than do other animals, accounting for more than
just the period between making a decision and experiencing its con-
sequences. For example, unlike other species examined thus far
(see [S5] for a review), they might rate maximize over the long
term, accounting for the entire duration of the experiment (including
the duration between trials, or intertrial interval [ITI]). This long-term
rate-maximization account (originally described in [S3]) would pre-
dict that subjects are indifferent when A2 / t2 + h2 + ITI) = A6/(t6 +
h6 + ITI), where ITI in this case is 30 s. Including the ITI increases
the average predicted rate-maximizing indifference point for chim-
panzees to 61.3 s and the predicted indifference point for bonobos
to 62.7 s. One-sample t tests comparing individual subject’s ob-
served indifference points to the average predicted indifference
point for each species shows that although bonobos did not signif-
icantly differ from their long-term rate-maximization prediction
[t(4) = 1.374, p = 0.241], chimpanzees waited longer than their
long-rate maximization prediction [t(4) = 3.862, p = 0.018]. Thus, bo-
nobos appear to maximize over the long term, but even examining
choices over this longer temporal window cannot account for the
chimpanzees’ pattern of discounting preferences.
Study 2: Comparison of Patience in Human and Chimpanzees
Subjects
We tested 19 adult and subadult chimpanzees from the same pop-
ulation as study 1 (12 individuals were from the same social group
as study 1; all individuals from a second social group of seven indi-
viduals were also tested). Five subjects participated in study 1 seven
months previously; the other 14 subjects were naive (see Table S3).
In addition, we tested 40 adult humans. Eighteen participants
were students from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthro-
pology in Leipzig, Germany. These volunteers received no compen-
sation for their participation other than the food. Twenty-two partic-
ipants were undergraduates from Harvard University in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, who received credit for a psychology course and
the food in return for their involvement. Fourteen additional subjects
were tested but excluded from the main analyses because they
reported that they did not like the food or were not hungry in the
questionnaire (see Exclusion Criteria below).
Human Procedure: Additional Details
Human participants were tested in a room either at the Max Planck
Institute in Leipzig, Germany or at Harvard University in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Subject testing times ranged across the day: In
Germany, all tests took place between 11:00 and 14:00, and in the
U.S.A., testing took place between 12:00 and 18:00 (as mentioned
in the main text, all subjects were informed beforehand that they
would eat food in the session and were requested to refrain from
eating for the hour proceeding the test if possible, to ensure food
motivation). Although all sessions were conducted in English, there
were minor variations between the instructions used in Germany and
the instructions used in the U.S.A. because of different requirements
for obtaining consent when testing human subjects. Once subjects
had been informed of the complete procedure (see Appendix A for
the script), they were asked to remove their watch if they were wear-
ing one. They were then allowed to pick their preferred food from the
set of options that were arrayed on a second table next to the test
table. Once they indicated their preference, the experimenter re-
trieved a box containing the appropriate food rewards that had
been portioned out into clear plastic cups prior to the subject’s
arrival; subjects could not see into this box because of an occluder
attached to the box that blocked their view.
Experimenter Behavior during Delays in the Human Procedure
During delays in the delay condition, the experimenter moved to an-
other chair approximately 3 m behind the experimenter’s seat at the
test table. The chair was perpendicular to the participant’s line of
sight; from this position the experimenter was visible to the partici-
pant, but not directly facing the participant. The experimenter sat in
this location looking at her clipboard for the duration of the delay
period, and the subject and the experimenter did not talk to each
other or socially interact (as was the case with the chimpanzees,
see above). Once the delay completed, the experimenter then told
the subject that he/she could eat the food; while the participant
ate, the experimenter returned to the main test table. While the sub-
ject ate his/her food rewards, the experimenter wrote on her clip-
board and did not make eye contact with the subject. During the
30 s ITI, the experimenter continued to write on his/her clipboard
as before.
Questionnaire
Once subjects completed the food test, they then completed a ques-
tionnaire with two parts (see Appendix B for the complete question-
naire). In part one, subjects (1) indicated their age and sex, (2) esti-
mated the most recent time they had eaten prior to the test, (3)
estimated the delay they had waited to receive the larger reward (if
participating in the delay condition), and (4) were asked an open-
ended question about why they made the choices they did. Individ-
uals who participated in the test at Harvard were also asked to rate
their level of hunger and the extent to which they liked the food they
had eaten on 5 point scales (based on the hunger scales used
previously in [S6]); for example, from 1, ‘‘Not at all hungry,’’ to 5,
‘‘Very hungry.’’ The second part of the questionnaire consisted of
ten standard discounting questions about money (based on the dis-
counting task used in [S7]). Subjects tested in Germany answered
questions about euro monetary amounts; whereas subjects tested
in the U.S.A. answered questions about dollar amounts. These ques-
tions were presented in random order across subjects.
Exclusion Criteria for Dropped Human Participants
As noted in the main text, we excluded human participants from
Study 2 if their responses on the questionnaire indicated that they
did not find the food items to be rewarding or desirable. This was
done so that it could be ensured that that human subjects actually
found the food to be rewarding because it is unlikely that individuals
would wait longer to receive things they did not like or want to have
(and indeed might have found it aversive to eat food they did not
want). The chimpanzees have extensive experience with grapes
both during daily feeding and in other experimental contexts, and
it is a preferred food for these test subjects. In contrast, the human
subjects might have had less direct experience or knowledge about
their chosen food prior to the experiment, or discovered that they
disliked it only once the experiment began. Furthermore, unlike
chimpanzees, human subjects who were not hungry or discovered
that they disliked their choice might have continued to eat it only
out of social obligation to complete the experiment. Human partici-
pants were therefore excluded from main analyses if they met any of
the following five criteria: (1) If the subject explicitly wrote on the
open-ended portion of their questionnaire that they made their
choices because they were not hungry, (2) if they explicitly wrote
that they did not like or want to eat the food they were provided
with in the experiment, (3) if they said they made the choices they
did because they were on a diet, (4) if they answered ‘‘not hungry’’
(scale points 1 or 2) on the hunger scale, or (5) if they answered
‘‘did not like food’’ on the food-desirability scale. Fourteen of the
total 54 participants tested met one or more of these criteria. How-
ever, the inclusion of these additional subjects does not influence
the main results (see below).
Statistical Analyses
We arcsine, square-root transformed all proportional choices of
both species.
Differences between Human Populations
In addition to the main analyses, we performed three further analy-
ses of the human choice data. First, we examined all 54 tested
participants (including those that met the exclusion criteria) by per-
forming a 2 (condition) 3 2 (human population) ANOVA to examine
how all participants responded to the delay manipulation, as well
as whether those tested in Germany or the United States differed
in their discounting preferences. This ANOVA revealed a main effect
of condition [subjects choose the larger reward more often in the
control condition; F(1, 50) = 14.889, p < .001] but no effect of popu-
lation [F(1, 50) = 0.518, p = 0.4750] nor any interactions. Conse-
quently, we combined both subject populations for all other statisti-
cal analyses.
Table S1. Individual Characteristics and Performance of Subjects from Study 1







Joey Bonobo M 23 9.5 32.0 92
Kuno Bonobo M 9 6.2 25.2 80
Limbuko Bonobo M 10 11.3 29.1 59
Ulindi Bonobo F* 12 6.7 20.9 91
Yasa Bonobo F 8 9.0 31.3 50
Bonobo Average 8.5 27.7 74.4
Dorien Chimpanzee F 26 2.9 16.7 162
Fraukje Chimpanzee F* 30 3.4 12.8 106
Patrick Chimpanzee M 8 5.6 18.7 108
Robert Chimpanzee M 31 5.4 24.6 157
Sandra Chimpanzee F 12 9.0 23.7 80
Chimpanzee Average 5.3 19.3 122.6
‘‘*’’ indicates a female with dependent offspring present in the testing room during sessions.
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Performance of Excluded Subjects
Second, we reanalyzed the main human-chimpanzee comparison
from study 2, but included the additional 14 human subjects who
originally met the exclusion criteria (for a total of 19 chimpanzees
and 54 humans). The chimpanzee data was identical with that in
the comparison reported in the main text. Subjects in this expanded
human subject pool choose the larger reward on an average of
62.7 6 4.5 percent of trials in the control condition (compared to
77.5% of trials when these additional subjects are excluded as re-
ported in the main analysis), and an average of 19.5 6 3.9 percent
of trials in the delay condition (as compared to 19.2% of trials
when these additional subjects are excluded as reported in the
main analysis). Thus, humans’ preference for the larger reward
therefore decreased by 69% when they were required to wait to re-
ceive it in the delay condition compared to when they could receive it
immediately in the control condition (compared with 19% with the
chimpanzees, as described in the main text).
As in the main text, a repeated-measures ANOVA with session half
as a within-subjects factor and species and condition as between-
subjects factors revealed main effects of condition [F(1, 69) =
14.292, p < 0.001] and species [F(1, 69) = 22.352, p < 0.001], with
both species preferring the large reward less in the control condi-
tion, and humans preferring the large reward less in both conditions.
There was no effect of session half, and the species 3 condition in-
teraction reported in the main text drops to only a trend when the
additional subjects are included [F(1, 69) = 2.707, p = 0.104]. This
analysis indicates that the human subjects’ preference for the larger
reward drops more in the delay condition than it does for chimpan-
zees regardless of the inclusion of these subjects. Rather, the main
effect of the exclusion criteria was to remove human subjects that
did not find the food to be rewarding regardless of waiting.
Role of Hunger in Human Choice
Third, we performed an analysis designed to assess the influence of
hunger or food motivation on the humans’ choices. This analysis
also included participants who were originally excluded because
they reported that they were not hungry; participants who were ex-
cluded for other reasons (i.e., they said they did not like the food or
were on a diet) were not included in this analysis. Based on the hun-
ger scale and subjects’ written responses, we had information about
the hunger state of 37 participants. These participants were given
a composite hunger score; a composite hunger score of 1 indicates
that subjects were not hungry when they completed the test (i.e.,
subjects rated their hunger as 1 or 2 on the scale or explicitly wrote
that they were not hungry), a composite hunger score of 2 indicated
that subjects were neutral (i.e., subjects rated their hunger as 3 on
the scale or explicitly wrote that they were neutral), and a composite
hunger score of 3 indicated that subjects were hungry (i.e., subjects
rated their hunger as 4 or 5 on the scale or explicitly wrote that they
were hungry).
A 2 (condition)3 3 (hunger score) ANOVA revealed a main effect of
condition [F(1, 31) = 10.51, p = 0.003], a main effect of hunger score
[F(2, 31) = 4.84, p = 0.015], and interaction between hunger and con-
dition [F(2, 31) = 7.64, p = 0.002]. A post-hoc Tukey test indicated
that in the control condition, hungry subjects (hunger score = 3)
picked the large reward more than nonhungry subjects did (hunger
score = 1; p = 0.001), and hungry subjects in the control condition
picked the large reward more than all subjects in the delay condition
(p < 0.04 for all cases). However, there were no significant
Table S2. Summary of Amounts, Delays, Indifference Points, and Rate-Maximization Predictions for Both Ape Species
Rate Maximization Summary Bonobos Chimpanzees
Small reward amount (A2) 2 pieces 2 pieces
Large reward amount (A6) 6 pieces 6 pieces
Short delay (t2) 1.6 s 1.6 s
Small reward handling time (h2) 8.5 s 5.3 s
Large reward handling time (h6) 27.7 s 19.3 s
Intertrial interval (ITI) 30 s 30 s
Average predicted indifference point: short-term rate maximization 3.1 s 2.6 s
Average predicted indifference point: long-term rate maximization 62.7 s 61.3 s
Average observed indifference point 74.4 s 122.6 s
Table S3. Individual Chimpanzee Subject Characteristics and Results from Study 2




Choice for Large Reward
Delay Condition, Proportion
Choice for Large Reward
Alex M 5 2 No 0.92 0.83
Alexandra F 6 2 No 1.00 0.83
Annett F 6 1 No 1.00 0.92
Corrie F* 30 2 No 0.83 0.67
Dorien F 26 1 Study 1 0.92 0.50
Fifi F 12 1 No 1.00 0.58
Fraukje F* 30 2 Study 1 1.00 0.50
Frodo M 12 1 No 0.92 0.83
Jahaga F 13 2 No 1.00 0.75
Lome M 4 1 No 0.83 0.75
Natascha F 27 1 No 0.58 0.83
Patrick M 8 1 Study 1 1.00 0.08
Pia F 6 2 No 1.00 0.50
Riet F* 29 2 No 0.58 0.75
Robert M 31 2 Study 1 0.83 0.58
Sandra F 12 1 Study 1 1.00 0.50
Swela F 10 1 No 0.67 0.83
Trudi F 12 2 No 1.00 0.92
Unyoro M 9 2 No 0.92 0.50
Condition order 1 indicates that subjects completed the control first, and condition order 2 indicates that they completed the delay first. Pro-
portional choices represent average over both test sessions per condition. All data was used for the within-chimpanzee comparison, whereas
only each individual’s first test session was used for the human comparison. ‘‘*’’ indicates a female with dependent offspring present in the test-
ing room during sessions.
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differences in the delay condition. That is, although participants
picked the large reward less frequently in the control condition if
they were not hungry at the time of testing, participants in the delay
condition were not willing to wait for the larger reward regardless of
their level of hunger.
Effect of Food Type on Human Choice
To address whether the human subjects’ food option had any im-
pact on their performance, we performed an additional analysis of
the human data with session half as a within-subjects factor and
condition as a between-subjects factor as before, but added chosen
food option (i.e., M&M’s, crackers, popcorn, peanuts, or raisins) as a
covariate. There was no influence of chosen food [F (1, 37) = 0.083,
p = 0.775], and, as before, there was a main effect of condition [F (1,
37 = 44.185, p < 0.001] but no effect of session half [F (1, 37) = 0.145,
p = 0.313] and no significant interactions. This indicates that sub-
jects tested with different foods did not differ in their choices and
were not more likely to become satiated over trials.
Effect of Past Discounting Experience on Chimpanzee Choice
Although all ape subjects in study 1 were naive to discounting tasks,
five of nineteen chimpanzees in study 2 had participated in study 1
seven months prior. To ensure that the inclusion of these nonnaive
subjects did not affect the results of study 2, we performed the sec-
ond (within-subjects) analysis of chimpanzees from study 2 with
only naive subjects. The main result reported previously, i.e., the dif-
ference between the delay and control conditions, holds [paired
t(14) = 2.802, p = 0.015], indicating that the inclusion of these expe-
rienced subjects did not substantially influence the results.
Response Times for Humans and Chimpanzees
We coded two additional indexes of motivation for chimpanzees and
humans: response latency (latency to make a choice) and food re-
trieval latency (latency to begin eating the food once it was avail-
able). For humans, choice latency was the period from when the ex-
perimenter finished saying ‘‘Do you prefer this cup, or this cup?’’ to
when the subject indicated a choice, and food retrieval latency was
from when E said ‘‘You can now have the food’’ to when the subject
first touched the food cup. For chimpanzees, response latency was
the period from when E removed the occluder to when the subject
slide the choice panel; and food retrieval latency was the duration
between when the food platform reached the front of the table and
the subject first touched the food through the hand hole. In all cases,
durations were coded as 0 s if, for example, subjects touched the
cup before the experimenter finished the sentence (humans) or put
their hands through the hole before the experimenter finished sliding
the platform forward (chimpanzees). For each subject, we coded
one choice trial for response latency, and another choice trial for
food retrieval latency, both counterbalanced for trial number across
subjects. Only 38 our of 40 human subjects could be assessed
because of damage to one of the tapes.
Choice latencies and latencies to retrieve the food were normally
only a few seconds for both species. Humans took an average of
1.3 s to make a choice, and average of 0.9 s to touch the food
once it was available. Chimpanzees took and average of 2.8 s to
make a choice, and an average of 1.0 s to touch the food once it
was available. Because humans and chimpanzees do not radically
differ in these measures, it suggests similar motivation levels for
the food: For example, if humans did not particularly want the
food, they might have had high response latencies (reflecting uncer-
tainty or lack of desire to begin eating the food). It is important to
note, however, that these measures are not directly comparable
across species because of the necessary differences in their respec-
tive paradigms.
Study 3: Patience and Reward Type
Subjects
We tested subjects from the same population of students at the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany
tested in study 2, but did not retest any subjects. All tests took place
in a room at the institute and occurred between 10:00 and 17:00. See
Appendix A for the experimenter’s script.
Questionnaire
Once subjects completed the money test, they then completed
a questionnaire with two parts (see Appendix B for the question-
naire). In part one, subjects (1) indicated their age and sex, (2) esti-
mated the delay they had waited to receive the larger reward, and
(3) responded to an open-ended question about why they made
the choices they did. The second part of the questionnaire consisted
of ten standard discounting questions used in study 2.
Statistical Analyses
All proportional choices were arcsine square-root transformed. As
reported in the main text, we performed an independent-samples t
test with condition (delayed money or delayed food) as a between-
subjects factor. Because the assumption of equal variances was
not met (Levene’s test, p < 0.001), the significance we report did
not assume equal variances.
Analysis of Discounting Questionnaire Responses
in Studies 2 and 3
Subjects chose the delayed reward a mean of 61.2% [SE =6 3.5%].
By using participants’ reponses over the ten questions, we calcu-
lated k values with the method developed by Kirby and Marakovic
[S7] that creates a consistency index of possible discounting rates
on the basis of each subject’s pattern of responses; the most con-
sistent value (or the geometric mean of multiple equally likely values)
is taken as the k for that particular subject. Though we did not assess
whether the hyperbolic model (from which k is derived) fits our data,
this model fits most human monetary discounting data better than
alternative models, such as exponential discounting [S8, S9]. A
one-way ANOVA of k values indicated that on the questionnaire,
preferences did not differ across the food control, food delay, or
money delay conditions [F(2, 57) = 0.100, p = 0.905]. The k value
seen in our study is comparable to that seen in other studies (for ex-
ample, a similar experiment [S7] found average ks ranging from
0.0113 and 0.0047, depending on whether the questions involved
small or large amounts of money; our questionnaire included ques-
tions falling across this spectrum; see Appendix B).
Correlation between Task Responses and Questionnaire
Responses
In addition, we assessed whether subjects’ responses in the experi-
ential tasks (the delayed food condition from study 2 and the
delayed money condition in study 3) were related to their responses
in the questionnaires. As with previous analyses, proportional
choices were arcsine square-root transformed. A partial correlation
controlling for reward type (food versus money) between propor-
tional choice for the larger rewards in the delayed tasks and propor-
tional choice for the larger rewards in the questionnaire revealed
a positive relationship (correlation coefficient = 0.334, 2-tailed p =
0.038). Thus, individuals who are more patient in the experiential
discounting tasks used here are also more patient in standard dis-
counting questionnaires, although the length of time they are willing
to wait varies dramatically.
Appendix A: Experimenter Instructions for Human Participants
in Studies 2 and 3
Study 2 Instructions for the Food Task
Italicized text appears only in the control condition; text inside pa-
rentheses appears only in the delay condition.
This is an experiment about decision-making, and will take no lon-
ger than 45 min. In the experiment you are going to be able to make
a series of choices about food, and after each decision you can eat
the food you choose. How much you receive will depend on the de-
cisions that you make. This part of the experiment will take no longer
than 31 min. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to com-
plete a questionnaire. This questionnaire will take about 10 min to
complete. Do you have any questions at this point?
In the test, you get to choose between two pieces of food, and six
pieces of food. I will ask you which of the options you prefer, and you
can then answer verbally or by pointing at your choice. Once you
have indicated your choice, I will say ‘‘You can now have the
food,’’ and you can then eat the option you have chosen. (Once I
say ‘‘You can now have the food,’’ you can then eat the option you
have chosen.) Specifically what will happen is that both options
will be in cups like this. I will ask you which cup you want, and
once you answer I will remove the other one. Then I will say right
away, ‘‘You can now have the food.’’ (If you pick the two pieces I
am allowed to give it to you immediately. However, if you choose
the six pieces I am not allowed to give it to you until after a set period
of time has passed. That is, if you chose the cup with two pieces, I
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will say right away, ‘‘You can now have the food.’’ But if you choose
the cup with six, you will have to wait before I say ‘‘You can now have
the food.’’)
Each trial will consist of just one choice like this. The total number
of trials was randomly predetermined, so the test could stop after
any number of trials. Therefore just choose according to your prefer-
ences when I actually ask you. There is no right or wrong way to do
this task. Before we start the experiment there will be a practice pe-
riod where you get to see how the procedure works and experience
both options (receiving the two pieces right away, and waiting for the
six pieces). This practice period can then guide your decisions when
you chose between the two options. Do you have any questions at
this point?
Throughout the test, you must eat all of the food before you can
proceed to the next trial—that is, you have to eat it here during the
test, and cannot take the food out of the test or save it for later.
You can take as long as you’d like to eat the food and eat it in any
way you’d like. (Throughout the test, the two pieces of food will
always be available immediately, and the six pieces will always be
associated with the same delay.) That’s a glass of water that you
should feel free to drink throughout the test if you get thirsty. Do
you have any questions at this point? (If you choose the six pieces
of food, during the delay period I will sit at that table over there,
and we are not allowed to talk to each other. Then when the delay
finishes you can eat the food.)
Before the actual test begins, if you are wearing a watch it could
you please remove it. Thank you. Now for the actual test, you will
be eating the same food throughout the test. However you can
choose beforehand what type of food you would like to eat. You
can choose from chocolate, popcorn, raisins, peanuts, and goldfish
crackers. Feel free to try these options before you decide.
Ok great. Now there’s going to be the practice period where you
get to experience each option two times each. In this practice period
I am going to set just one cup in front of you, and then ask you how
many items are in the cup. Once you answer I will immediately say
‘‘You can now have the food,’’ and then you can consume your
choice. (If the cup has two pieces of food in it, once you answer I
will immediately say ‘‘You can now have the food.’’ But if the cup
has six pieces, there will be a delay before I say you can eat it.)
Once you have experienced each option twice, I will tell you that
the practice period is over and the actual test will begin. Do you
have any questions at this point?
Then we will begin with the practice period.
Study 3 Instructions for the Money Task
This is an experiment about decision-making, and will take no longer
than 45 min. In the experiment you are going to be able to make a se-
ries of choices about money, and after each decision you will receive
the money you choose, which you can keep when the experiment is
finished. How much money you receive will depend on the decisions
that you make. This part of the experiment will take no longer than
30 min. At the end of the experiment you will asked to complete
a questionnaire. This questionnaire will take about 10 min to com-
plete. Do you have any questions at this point?
In the test, you get to choose between different numbers of coins.
Specifically, you can choose between two 10 cent coins—that is, 20
cents—and six 10 cent coins, or 60 cents. I will ask you which of the
options you prefer, and you can then answer verbally or by pointing
at your choice. Once I say ‘‘You can now have the money,’’ you can
then take the option you have chosen and put it in your cup here to
keep. Specifically what will happen is both options will be in cups
like this. I will ask you which cup you want, and once you answer I
will remove the other one. If you pick the two coins I am allowed to
give them to you immediately. However, if you choose the six coins
I am not allowed to give them to you until after a set period of time
has passed. That is, if you chose the cup with two coins, I will say
right away, ‘‘You can now have the money.’’ But if you choose the
cup with six, you will have to wait before I say ‘‘You can now have
the money.’’
Each trial will consist of one choice like this. The total number of
trials was randomly predetermined, so the test could stop after
any number of trials. Therefore just choose according to your prefer-
ences when I actually ask you. There is no right or wrong way to do
this task. Before we start the experiment there will be a practice pe-
riod where you get to see how the procedure works and experience
both options: receiving the two coins right away, and waiting for the
six coins. You get to keep the money you receive during this practice
period, and the practice period can then guide your decisions when
you chose between the two options. Do you have any questions at
this point?
Throughout the test, you get to keep all of the money you choose.
After every trial, you can put your chosen amount in this cup here.
When the test is over, you can trade in the coins for larger bills if
you prefer. Throughout the test, the two coins will always be avail-
able immediately, and the six coins will always be associated with
the same delay. Additionally, that’s a glass of water that you should
feel free to drink throughout the test if you get thirsty. Do you have
any questions at this point?
If you choose the six coins, then during the delay period I will sit at
that table over there, and we are not allowed to talk to each other.
Then when the delay finishes you can have the money and put it in
your cup. Before the actual test begins, if you are wearing a watch
it could you please remove it. Thank you.
Ok great. Now there’s going to be the practice period where you
get to experience each option two times each. In this practice period
I am going to set one cup in front of you, and then ask you how many
items are in the cup. If the cup has two coins in it, once you answer I
will immediately say ‘‘You can now have the money.’’ But if the cup
has six coins, there will be a delay before I say you can have it. Once
you have experienced each option twice, the actual test will begin.
Do you have any questions at this point? Great. Now we will begin
with the practice period.
Studies 2 and 3: Questionnaire Instructions
Part I: The first part of the questionnaire consists of some basic in-
formation about yourself as well as a question about the decisions
you made in the previous test. Once you have completed this part
of the questionnaire, I will then give you a series of questions about
money and time.
Part II: Items 5-14 [or 7-16 depending on condition] are a series of
questions about money and time. For each question, you can indi-
cate your preference between two options: a smaller amount of
money that that you could have today, or a larger amount that you
could have after some delay. Although you will not receive the op-
tions that you chose, please make your choices as though they
will actually be paid to you. I will present these questions to you
one at a time, and you can mark the option you prefer on the sheet.
Once you have completed a question you can return it to me and I
will give you the next question.
Appendix B: Sample Questionnaire Used in Studies 2 and 3
‘‘*’’ indicates questions that were administered only to subjects from
study 2 tested at Harvard University. ‘‘**’’ indicates a question
administered only to subjects in the delay conditions in studies 2
and 3.
Part I
1. What is your sex? M_____ F_____
2. What is your age (in years)? ______
3. Please estimate the most recent time you ate something today
prior to the test: _______
*4. Please rate how hungry you were before the test started:
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all hungry Neutral Very Hungry
*5. Please rate how much you liked the type of food you ate in the
test:
1 2 3 4 5
Disliked strongly Neutral Like strongly
**6. Please estimate the length of the delay associated with the
six pieces (in minutes) to the best of your ability: ______
7. Please briefly explain why you chose the number of options (2
versus 6) that you did in the test:
Part II
8. Would you prefer to receive $27 today or $69 in 90 days?
____$27 ____$69
9. Would you prefer to receive $15 today or $50 in 45 days?
____$15 ____$50
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10. Would you prefer to receive $17 today or $52 in 220 days?
____$17 ____$52
11. Would you prefer to receive $22 today or $70 in 20 days?
____$22 ____$70
12. Would you prefer to receive $35 today or $55 in 100 days?
____$35 ____$55
12. Would you prefer to receive $31 today or $59 in 150 days?
____$31 ____$59
14. Would you prefer to receive $33 today or $60 in 110 days?
____$33 ____$60
15. Would you prefer to receive $24 today or $63 in 50 days?
____$24 ____$63
16. Would you prefer to receive $29 today or $59 in 275 days?
____$29 ____$59
17. Would you prefer to receive $34 today or $51 in 195 days?
____$34 ____$51
[Subjects who completed the test at the Max Plank Institute
answered identical questions, but the monetary unit was the euro].
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